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BOOK REVIEW 
The Interactive Constitution: An Essay on Clothing 
Emperors and Searching for Constitutional Truth 
REMNANTS OF BELIEF. By Louis Michael Seidman and Mark V. Tushnet. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996) Pp. vii, 218. $35.00. 
REVIEWED BY NEAL DEVINS* 
INTRODUCfiON 
Did the New Deal kill constitutional discourse? Michael Seidman and Mark 
Tushnet think so, and their book, Remnants of Belief, 1 is an attempt to explain 
why and to suggest ways that this New Deal devil can be exorcised from 
constitutional argument. 
Seidman and Tushnet's tract is at once pessimistic and romantic. Boldly 
proclaiming that the New Deal revolution made it "apparent to everyone" that 
all constitutional arguments can and will be "manipulated to advance the 
particular policy goal of the advocate who makes them, " 2 Remnants contends 
that constitutional discourse does not matter because it fails to persuade. 
Seidman and Tushnet then, have written a book that taps into the "cynical 
disengagement that is said to mark the 'X Generation.' " 3 
Remnants, however, also waxes poetic about the "glory days" of New Deal 
and Great Society liberalism4 as well as its judicial embodiment-the Warren 
Court-which "restored the good name of active judicial review. " 5 Along these 
lines, Seidman and Tushnet, who came of age in the 1960s,6 embrace reform 
proposals that "satisfy liberal nostalgia for the lost youth of constitutional 
argument." 7 Specifically, they trumpet the "promise" of narrative jurisprudence 
and implore lawyers to "maintain sympathy and understanding for the positions 
they oppose. " 8 By calling upon constitutional advocates to "maintain[ ] a sense 
* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. Thanks to Mark Graber, 
Mike Klarman, Tom Krattenmaker, Alan Meese, Bob Nagel, and Cynthia Ward for commenting on an 
earlier draft of this review. All errors are my own. 
I . L. MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TuSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF ( 1996). 
2. /d. at 90. 
3. /d. at 194. 
4 . /d. at 176. 
5. /d. at 43. 
6. Seidman was born in 1947, graduated from law school in 1971, and clerked for Justice Thurgood 
Marshall in 1972. Tushnet was born in 1945, graduated from law school in 1971, and also clerked for 
Justice Marshall in 1972. 
7. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I , at 191. 
8. /d. at 195-96. 
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of political community" with their opponents,9 Seidman and Tushnet hope that 
intrinsically politicized constitutional discourse may be conducted with a more 
explicit, honest focus on public policy tradeoffs. 
In this book review, I argue that Remnants is provocative, important, and 
unconvincing. While Seidman and Tushnet expertly demonstrate the limits of 
modem constitutional argument, they either ignore or undervalue the virtues of 
the current system. In particular, by making legal academics and Supreme Court 
Justices the focus of their analysis and recommendations, Seidman and Tushnet 
never take stock of the vital role that nonjudicial actors play in shaping 
constitutional values. The constitutionalization of political discourse, instead, is 
discounted as the trivialization of constitutional analysis. This assessment misses 
the mark. Constitutional dialogues both among elected officials and between the 
courts and elected government are inevitable and, at least sometimes, healthy. 
On abortion, school desegregation, and other deeply divisive topics, these 
exchanges have made the Constitution more relevant and enduring. As such, 
rather than erect a wall separating crass political discourse from intellectually 
rigorous constitutional analysis, there is reason to recognize that some good can 
come from the political practice of "reflexively transform[ing] policy controver-
sies into constitutional problems." 10 
Before serving up a celebration of the status quo, I will examine Seidman and 
Tushnet's proof of the failings of post-New Deal constitutional analysis, highlight-
ing some of their book's ample teachings, but also casting doubt on its central 
claim that constitutional discourse is at once flawed and vital. Specifically, 
Seidman and Tushnet never explain why, if all constitutional discourse is 
ultimately political, legal elites should engage in "constitutionalized" public 
policy analysis. By not examining what gives the Constitution independent 
force and why legal elites should perform quintessentially political cost-benefit 
analysis, Remnants provides no foundation for its reform proposals. Further-
more, by ignoring nonjudicial political actors, Seidman and Tushnet imply that 
it should be legal elites alone who conduct this policy-driven constitutional 
discourse. 
In this way, Remnants appears as value-laden as the theories of constitutional 
interpretation it criticizes. Indeed, by calling attention to the myriad ways in 
which Seidman and Tushnet embrace activist, progressive judicial review, I 
suggest that a skeptical reader can spin the book's generalist critique of post-
New Deal constitutional argument into a condemnation of the conservative 
handiwork of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. This is unfortunate; Seidman 
and Tushnet's commitment to making constitutional discourse more honest, 
civil, and believable is commendable and almost certainly sincere. Furthermore, 
had Seidman and Tushnet forthrightly incorporated nonjudicial actors into their 
analysis, their call for activist judicial review would appear more sensible and 
9. /d. at 196. 
10. /d. at 3. 
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more principled. Differences in the ways that courts and political actors reward 
and punish interest groups necessitate that all branches and levels of govern-
ment participate in the shaping of public policy. 
I. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
On March 29, 1937, America's constitutional landscape was changed forever. 
A series of Supreme Court decisions upholding state and federal efforts to 
combat the Depression lowered structural and substantive barriers to New Deal 
reforms. 11 This constitutional revolution eviscerated the Lochner era, 12 a period 
from 1905 to 1937 during which the Court infused laissez-faire economics into 
its constitutional analysis in order to strike down roughly two hundred social 
and economic laws. Universally condemned as a symbol of unprincipled judi-
cial overreaching, the Lochner era helped prompt populist, political, and aca-
demic attacks against the Court. 13 Although FOR's Court-packing plan is the 
best known of these attacks, the most devastating attack came from legal realist 
academics. 
Claiming that the baseline principles underlying judicial decisionmaking 
were both arbitrary and susceptible to manipulation, legal realists suggested that 
courts are fundamentally political organs, putting into place the normative 
values that judges find desirable. In particular, legal realists of the 1920s and 
1930s savaged the Lochner Court's free market philosophy "with a degree of 
insight, brilliance, and social passion that has never been equaled since." 14 
Emphasizing that the market was a social rather than a natural construct, legal 
realism provided New Dealers with an intellectual framework that justified 
government intrusions into the Depression-plagued marketplace. 15 
Legal realism did more than justify the repudiation of the Lochner Court, 
however. For proponents of the administrative state, the legal realist attack 
explained why expert administrators were better suited than judges "to promote 
justice or efficiency in economic regulation." 16 For Seidman and Tushnet, this 
New Deal innovation revealed a larger truth about the judicial role-that 
constitutional interpretation is inescapably value-laden and, as such, constitu-
tional analysis will always be driven by "a particular set of policy preferences 
II. The structural barriers were federalism and the nondelegation doctrine, and the substantive 
barrier was liberty to contract. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 
(1937); Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937). 
I2. See Lochner v. New York, I98 U.S. 45 (1905). 
13. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993); MORTON J. HOROWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-I960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (I992); 
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN (1995). 
14. HOROWITZ, supra note 13, at 195. 
I5. See id. at I94-98; SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 32-33. See generally ROBERT J. 
GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER (I985). 
I6. HOROWITZ, supra note I3, at 2I5. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
(1938). 
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that cannot be distinguished from the preferences expressed in other political 
forums." 17 
The New Deal revolution, according to this account, was directly at odds 
with "the great hope of constitutional law," which was to provide a "common 
language" that would allow for the discussion of contested political issues "on 
a higher level of generality." 18 By "destroy[ing]" the "predicates" of constitu-
tional argument, "the possibility of genteel discussion within an elite that 
agreed on a common set of premises" 19 was forever lost. As a result, at least for 
Seidman and Tushnet, the line separating constitutional from base political 
discourse has been eviscerated, and constitutional argument has become another 
form of "the language of American politics. " 20 
Remnants does not mince words here. It details what Seidman and Tushnet 
consider to be the horrifying fallout from this New Deal revolution. The quality 
of constitutional argument, we are told, "has been very poor indeed. " 21 Rather 
than recognize that constitutional questions are "hard," commentators "persis-
tent[ly]" treat them as if they were "easy" and characterize those who disagree 
as "foolish, or evil, or dangerous. " 22 As a result, although "Americans are 
preoccupied with constitutional argument, . . . very few people are actually 
persuaded by the tendentiousness . . . [that] has become a hallmark of our 
constitutional debate. " 23 
Seidman and Tushnet's attack on sound bite constitutional analysis extends 
well beyond the usual suspects of politicians, policy wonks, and newspaper 
columnists. They also find legal academics and judges guilty of oversimplified, 
single-minded, and sometimes self-contradictory constitutional analysis. In-
deed, the focus of Seidman and Tushnet's analysis is the failure of legal elites to 
engage in nuanced, evenhanded constitutional discourse. 
To illustrate the sorry state of contemporary constitutional discourse, Seidman 
and Tushnet highlight similar failings in the constitutional arguments of both 
"liberal[s]" 24 and "[r]ight-wing[ers]." 25 For example, conservative Robert Bork 
and progressive Laurence Tribe share the disagreeable "habit of demonizing . 
[their] opponents and presenting [their] own views as if they were the only 
conclusions a fair-minded person could reach. " 26 Worse still, Bork and Tribe 
conceal their biases "ineptly and transparently," adjusting their constitutional 
17. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 42. 
18. /d. at 166. 
19. /d. at vii , 165. 
20. /d. at 3. 
21. /d. at 4. 
22. /d. at 4-5. 
23. /d. at vii , 9. 
24. /d. at 12. 
25 . /d. at 18. 
26. /d. at 13. In addition to the Bork-Tribe pairing, Seidman and Tushnet also pair newspaper 
columnists George Will (from the right) and Nat Hentoff (from the left), as well as an article written by 
conservative academic Michael McConnell with an article written by liberal academics Cass Sunstein 
and David Strauss. /d. at 5-9, 15-20. 
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theories to reach their desired outcomes.27 For Seidman and Tushnet, this 
failing underscores why constitutional discourse is unpersuasive and thus, 
irrelevant. Specifically, rather than "assume direct responsibility" for heartfelt 
personal beliefs,28 constitutional advocates pretend to engage in principled 
academic discourse while wearing their biases on their sleeves. Combusting 
with this hypocrisy, constitutional advocates, by refusing to appreciate their 
opponents' counterarguments, "rarely reach out to the uncommitted and virtu-
ally never throw new or interesting light on [a particular constitutional] prob-
lem. " 29 This practice, according to Seidman and Tushnet, is pervasive, extending 
to "virtually all modem constitutional advocacy, including [their] own. " 30 
Seidman and Tushnet's mea culpa sets the stage for their extended analysis of 
Supreme Court decisionmaking over a range of controversial issues, including 
racial equality, pornography, the death penalty, and the state action requirement. 
This often compelling analysis repeatedly and, most often, convincingly demon-
strates that constitutional questions are hard and that attempts to simplify them 
are unpersuasive. Moreover, Remnants makes a second claim that anchors much 
of the book's attack against post-New Deal constitutional analysis. By showing 
that Supreme Court Justices often use constitutional theory to support desired 
policy outcomes, 31 Seidman and Tushnet contend that constitutional theory is 
not about some generalized search for constitutional truth, but instead, operates 
as a funnel, eliminating from consideration alternative realities.32 In this way, 
constitutional theory has the effect of making constitutional argument oversimpli-
fied and one-sided: "Instead of a technique for settling disputes by resort to 
reason," constitutional theory is a mechanism "of asserting power over others" 
and, consequently, "will not succeed in bridging disagreement over the things 
we care about the most." 33 
Witness DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services?4 
Holding that local governmental authorities do not have an affirmative duty to 
prevent child abuse, the Supreme Court refused to hold Winnebago County 
27. /d. at 21. Bork's desire to put the Framers' intent into effect, according to Seidman and Tushnet, 
varies from issue to issue. When it comes to the death penalty, "judges ought not to apply their own 
evolving morality"; on questions of gender equality, however, Bork recognizes that it is appropriate for 
constitutional doctrine to evolve when "society has changed." /d. at 10-12 (quoting Robert Bork). Tribe 
commits a similar error. His due process and equal protection jurisprudence, as revealed in his attacks 
on Bork's judicial philosophy, "are at war with each other." /d. at 14. In particular, while Tribe 
embraces judicial discretion when it comes to abortion and other privacy rights, he condemns Bork's 
embrace of a "reasonable basis" test to evaluate classifications involving women and the poor because 
judges should not have "discretion in enforcing equal protection rights." /d. at 15. 
28. ld. at 20. 
29. /d. at 21. 
30. ld. at 24-25. 
31. Seidman and Tushnet make this point by contrasting inconsistencies in the decisionmaking of 
Justices Scalia and Brennan on speech and property rights cases decided in 1987. See id. at 75-76. 
32. ld. at 20-21. 
33. /d. at 189. 
34. 489 u.s. 189 (1989). 
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responsible for the gross negligence of one of its social service workers.35 For 
Seidman and Tushnet, DeShaney is a hard case. On the one hand, social workers 
now know that they are shielded from liability when they do not do their jobs 
and, consequently, are less likely to play an affirmative pro-active role. 36 On the 
other hand, had the Court found the county liable, social workers would have 
incentive to intervene "where it is unwarranted as well as where it is appropri-
ate. " 37 Furthermore, to finance more frequent intervention, taxes would have to 
be increased or competing social service programs would have to be scaled 
back.38 
The DeShaney decision, as Seidman and Tushnet insightfully explain, does 
not reveal these competing social policy concerns. Chief Justice William Re-
hnquist cloaks his majority opinion with a supposedly neutral action-inaction 
distinction-a distinction that, for Seidman and Tushnet, finds support neither in 
constitutional history nor in Supreme Court decisionmaking. 39 This opprobrium 
is not limited to the majority opinion; Seidman and Tushnet savage Justice 
Harry Blackmun's emotional dissent for its failure to consider the question that 
supposedly animates it, namely, whether "[d]oing justice" supports the state or 
"poor Joshua."40 By not considering which outcome "will make social workers 
more careful in the future and prevent more such tragedies," 41 Seidman and 
Tushnet find Blackmun's analysis a simplistic knee-jerk reaction to a difficult 
social policy issue. 42 
DeShaney underscores the failure of both conservatives and progressives to 
seriously examine the policy outcomes of the decisions they render, and is thus, 
for Seidman and Tushnet, emblematic of the failings of contemporary constitu-
tional argument.43 To "escape from this cycle, " 44 they propose that we replace 
the search for constitutional truth with an open-ended dialogue of competing 
values. For them, one mechanism that "holds some promise for reconstructing 
constitutional discourse" is to "explore storytelling as a means of improving 
35. See id. at 196-97. As a result, Joshua DeShaney, severely beaten and permanently disabled by his 
abusive father, could not challenge the county's repeated and knowing failure to intercede in a clearly 
abusive relationship. 
36. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 54. 
37. /d. at 59. 
38. /d. 
39. /d. at 52-55. 
40. /d. at 58. 
41. /d. 
42. Tushnet earlier described Justice Blackmun's dissent as reflecting "nothing other than compas-
sion, no awareness that Joshua's case stands for a broader set of circumstances that will inevitably be 
regulated by the rule the Court adopts." Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 
81 GEO. L.J. 251, 302 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 
43. Six of the book's nine chapters are case study illustrations of the complexity of constitutional 
controversies. Each of these illustrations succeeds in demonstrating that competing normative visions 
and indeterminate evidence cloud the resolution of constitutional disputes. 
44. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 189. 
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our understanding of law. " 45 Recognizing, however, that narrative jurispru-
dence might be "just as tendentious" as existing styles of argument,46 Seidman 
and Tushnet ultimately seek shelter in Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer,47 a 
book that claims there is a nexus between the quality of public decisionmaking 
and an advocate's ability "to maintain sympathy and understanding for the 
positions they oppose. " 48 
In advancing this argument, Seidman and Tushnet do not seriously consider 
the possibility that there is a right approach to solving constitutional problems. 
Pointing to the sophistry of constitutional advocates and the difficulties posed 
by constitutional questions, they assume that the political triumph of legal 
realism was deserved. For Seidman and Tushnet, this means that constitutional-
ists must develop "a kind of dual consciousness" -not forgetting "their hard-
won knowledge of the emptiness of constitutional arguments" while "somehow 
authentically" acting as if constitutional arguments "were not empty. " 49 
II. THE CONSTITUTION IS DEAD! LONG LIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION! 
Remnants, while portraying itself as a reformist manifesto, cannot free itself 
from the shackles of its doom and gloom assessment of the failure of contempo-
rary constitutional discourse. Describing their proposal as a plea for a "kind of 
maturity, self-knowledge, and tolerance for contradiction that no society in 
history has been able to muster," 50 Seidman and Tushnet recognize that their 
attempt to resuscitate constitutional interpretation will almost certainly fail. 
Why then write this book? Seidman and Tushnet contend that Remnants is a 
last gasp attempt to bring together competing factions in today's constitutional 
interpretation wars,51 presumably so that all sides can admit that their work is 
biased and incomplete. By admitting to weaknesses in their own work and by 
45. ld. at 195. 
46. /d. at 201. For a more detailed treatment of the limits of narrative jurisprudence, see generally 
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal Narrative, 45 
STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993); Tushnet, supra note 42. For responses to these articles, see generally William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994); Gary Peller, The Discourse of 
Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313 (1992). 
47 . ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). 
48. SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note I, at 196. Like Seidman and Tushnet, Kronman finds fault with 
the triumph of winner-take-all advocacy over truth-seeking. See KRONMAN, supra note 47, at 133 
(maintaining that lawyers must deliberate with their clients "about the wisdom of their clients' ends"). 
For a provocative critique of Kronman's book and a more optimistic assessment of the possible moral 
virtues of contemporary law practice, see generally David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for Practicing 
Lawyers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1994). 
49. SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note I, at 201. Tushnet has previously repudiated grand theories of 
constitutional decisionmaking, and in so doing, disavowed the relevance of the Constitution as well as 
judicial review. MARK V. T'USHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE (1988); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, 
Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law, 67 TEx. L. REv. 393, 403 (1988) ("Tushnet maintains 
that the republican tradition requires neither constitutional theory nor a constitution."). 
50. SEIDMAN & T'USHNET, supra note I , at 201. 
51. /d. at 198-99. 
HeinOnline -- 85 Geo. L.J. 698 1996-1997
698 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 85:691 
underscoring the complexity of constitutional controversies, Seidman and Tush-
net profess hope that constitutionalists of all stripes will consider the sound 
arguments of their opponents so that their own arguments can be more honest, 
forthright, nuanced, and accepting. 
Remnants, however, may be as much an example of the ills of values-based 
constitutional discourse as it is an antidote to the disease Seidman and Tushnet 
describe. In particular, Remnants never explains why, if constitutional interpreta-
tion is inherently political, legal elites should engage in "constitutional" cost-
benefit public policy analysis. 5 2 Moreover, Seidman and Tushnet's claims about 
the political triumph of legal realism, and with it the New Deal origins of 
politicized one-sided constitutional interpretation, are problematic. Although 
legal realist scholarship may have fundamentally affected the content of legal 
academic discourse, politicized constitutional debate dates back to the nation's 
founding. For example, several significant pre-New Deal political challenges to 
Supreme Court decisionmaking make clear that both judges and elected officials 
have always understood that politics plays a role in shaping constitutional 
decisionmaking. By speaking of the legal realist origins of politicized constitu-
tional interpretation, Seidman and Tushnet implicitly discount the relevance of 
these pre-New Deal challenges. 5 3 As a result, Remnants seems more like a book 
about legal elite interpretation than a book dedicated to the larger enterprise of 
improving the quality of constitutional interpretation. 54 
Correspondingly, by focusing their sights on legal elite discourse, Seidman 
and Tushnet never let on to what role, if any, elected officials should play in 
shaping constitutional values. Consequently, although they may well believe 
that pre-New Deal constitutional argument was politicized, and although they 
never express disapproval of joint political-judicial resolutions of disputed 
policy questions, Remnants nevertheless elevates-perhaps unintentionally-
legal elite constitutional discourse. At the very least, by isolating legal elite 
discourse, Seidman and Tushnet suggest that legal academics and judges are 
better positioned than politicians to follow their call for "dual consciousness. "55 
As such, their description of the problem Remnants is intended to address is far 
too narrow. Legal elite constitutional interpretation, while certainly important, is 
but a part of the broader enterprise of constitutional decisionmaking. 
52. Specifically, Seidman and Tushnet call for constitutionalists to examine the policy outcomes of 
the decisions they render, to take seriously the arguments of individuals whose values they disagree 
with, and to engage in an open-ended dialogue of competing values. An example of this type of 
cost-benefit analysis is Remnants's insightful critique of DeShaney. See supra notes 34-42 and 
accompanying text. 
53. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. 
54. Seidman and Tushnet make clear that their concern relates to academic discourse by describing 
"[t]he New Deal revolution [as] destroy[ing] forever the possibility of genteel discussion within an elite 
that agreed on a common set of premises." SEIDMAN & TusHNEf, supra note I, at 165. 
55. Id. at 201. Remnants thereby suggests that "constitutionalized" policy solutions crafted by legal 
elites (or, at least, legal elites who practice "skeptical tolerance and an ironic self-awareness") are 
superior to solutions crafted by politicians. /d. 
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A. THE LAW-POLITICS NEXUS 
The politicization of constitutional decisionmaking dates back to the nation's 
founding. John Marshall, by placing politics ahead of the search for constitu-
tional truth, has been dubbed "the great Nietzschean judge of our tradition. " 56 
For example, Marshall advanced his Federalist Party agenda for a strong 
national government through Marbury v. Madison, 57 McCulloch v. Maryland,58 
and other landmark rulings. This fact was not lost on Marshall's political 
opponents, including Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, who denounced 
these decisions.59 More importantly, Jefferson and Jackson were willing to act 
on this disagreement. Jefferson, outraged that Federalist judges failed to strike 
down the Alien and Sedition Acts,60 pardoned all individuals convicted under 
the statute;61 Jackson, claiming that he was not bound to follow McCulloch, 
vetoed as unconstitutional a bill that sought to recharter the Bank of the United 
States.62 
This intermingling of law and politics, of course, is not limited to Marshall, 
Jefferson, and Jackson. Immediately before the Court's ruling in Dred Scott,63 
Justices Catron and Grier, "contrary to [their] usual practice," wrote President-
elect James Buchanan of their intent to invalidate the Missouri Compromise and 
thereby "settle a controversy which has so long and seriously agitated this 
country. " 64 Following the Civil War, despite the efforts of late-nineteenth-
century classical legal thinkers to "create an autonomous legal culture," 65 
President Ulysses Grant used his appointments power to promote Republican 
Party policies; this included obtaining the Court's approval of legislation that 
treated paper money as legal terider for the purpose of discharging prior debts. 
Although the Court had just invalidated the statute, Grant engineered a five-to-
four reversal of the earlier decision by appointing two Republican Justices to 
join the three already on the Court.66 
56. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373, 389 ( 1982). 
57 . 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
58. 17 U.S . (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
59. Jefferson condemned "the impropriety of [the Court's] gratuitous interference" in Marbury. 15 
THE WRmNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 447 (Albert Bergh ed., 1907). For descriptions of the politics 
surrounding Marshall's landmark rulings in Marbury and McCulloch, see LoUis FISHER & NEAL 
DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITlJTIONAL LAW 25-44 (2d ed. 1996). For a discussion of the 
circumstances surrounding Jackson's veto, see id. at 18. 
60. Sedition Act of 1798, I Stat. 596 (prohibiting activities and writings opposing federal govern-
ment measures). 
61 . Jefferson believed "the law to be a nullity, as absolute and palpable as if Congress had ordered 
us to fall down and worship a golden image." I THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 59, at 
43 . 
62. A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 581-87 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1896). 
63 . Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
64. 10 THE WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN 106-08 (James B. Moore ed., 1910). Prior to this correspon-
dence, Catron wrote Buchanan urging him to pressure Grier to sign the opinion. /d. at 106 n.l. 
65 . See HoROWITZ, supra note 13, at 9-31 (describing structure of classical legal thought) . 
66. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), overruled by Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 
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The prevalence and visibility of these constitutional conflicts-all of which 
occurred during this nation's first century-suggest that legal realism's principal 
achievement was its repudiation of Lochner's free market philosophy, not the 
destruction of the ideal that law and politics can and should be separated. 
Although classical legal thought dominated judicial rhetoric from the end of the 
Civil War until the turn of the century,67 persistent constitutional dialogues 
between courts and elected officials have always stood as a vivid reminder of 
the nexus between law and politics. 
Along these lines, the advent of legal realist scholarship had very little to do 
with Franklin Delano Roosevelt's attempt to dethrone the Lochner Court. For 
example, notwithstanding the power of legal realist attacks against the concep-
tion of a self-executing market economy, the Roosevelt administration's efforts 
to pressure the Court were silenced by adverse public reaction to FOR's 1935 
denouncement of the Court's "horse and buggy definition of interstate com-
merce."68 Two years later, emboldened by his landslide 1936 victory, Roosevelt 
launched his ill-fated proposal to pack the Court with Justices sympathetic to 
the New Deal agenda. Given his belief that the only way to affect Supreme 
Court decisionmaking was through purely political means,69 Roosevelt undoubt-
edly saw the Supreme Court as a political institution. Unlike the legal realists, 
however, the question of whether law was inherently political did not matter to 
Roosevelt. Rather, believing that the only way to advance his reformist agenda 
was to bring down the Lochner Court, Roosevelt set out to accomplish that task 
through brute force, not academic critique. 
Roosevelt ultimately placed his imprimatur on the Court. From 1937 to 1940, 
he appointed five close associates to the Court.70 The Roosevelt Revolution, 
(12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1871). But see Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme 
Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1128, 1142 (1941) (questioning whether Justice 
Bradley promised Grant that he would vote in favor of legislation that treated paper money as legal 
tender). 
67. Starting with Oliver Wendell Holmes's "The Path of the Law" address in 1897, O.W. Holmes, 
Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897), claims within the legal profession that judges 
found, rather than made, the law gave way to the progressive belief that law cannot be separated from 
politics and social reality. See HOROWITZ, supra note 13, at 142, 193-212; see also SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, 
supra note I, at 32-35. In 1908, for example, Louis Brandeis introduced sociological studies to support 
maximum hours legislation to protect working women from the physiological and psychological effects 
of long hours. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,419 (1908). 
68. Michael Nelson, The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Court-Packing Episode of 
1937, 103 PoL Sci. Q. 267, 276-78 (1988) (detailing public opinion polls and press coverage of FDR's 
attacks on Lochner Court decisionmaking). 
69. See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 250-56 
· (1996) (describing President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan in review of LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 
13). 
70. Roosevelt appointed Hugo Black in 1937; Stanley Reed and Felix Frankfurter in 1938; and 
William 0. Douglas and Frank Murphy in 1939. See fiSHER & DEVINS, supra note 59, at 79. 
Roosevelt's landslide victory in 1936 also convinced Justice Owen Roberts to uphold some New Deal 
reforms. In Roberts's own words: "Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted 
the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the country-for what in effect was a unified 
economy." OWEN J. ROBERTS, JR., THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1951). 
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however, did not fundamentally change the ways _in which the Supreme Court 
and the elected branches of government interact with each other. Attempts to 
change the direction of legal doctrine through judicial appointments, for ex-
ample, were well established before Roosevelt.71 Indeed, Congress's repudia-
tion of Court-packing specifically embraced the use of appointments as an 
"orderly" way to transform the judiciary.72 Consequently, by calling attention 
to the political nature of constitutional interpretation, the New Deal reinforced 
that which had come before it. 73 
This is not to say that the New Deal did not alter constitutional discourse. In 
particular, the New Deal signalled the rise of the administrative state and, with 
it, the increasing importance of constitutional interpretation to American life. 
From the end of the Civil War until 1929, the nation's economic substructure 
was radically transformed by the Industrial Revolution.74 By 1932, with the 
Great Depression firmly under way, Roosevelt promised to reinvigorate govern-
ment and "meet the urgent needs of a twentieth-century community." 75 The 
ensuing fight between FOR and the Lochner Court both made constitutional 
interpretation more visible and increased awareness of the Court's vulnerability 
to political attack. Moreover, once FOR prevailed, the importance of constitu-
tional interpretation was not lost on a nation now subject to increasing regula-
tion by a rapidly growing administrative bureaucracy. Furthermore, with Court-
packing and other Roosevelt initiatives confirming the law-politics nexus, 
constitutional interpretation became a more pervasive part of American political 
life.76 
B. THE EMPTINESS OF (LEGAL ELITE) CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
The New Deal changed our conception of government and, in so doing, 
further politicized constitutional decisionmaking. Thus, there is force to Seidman 
and Tushnet's claims about the New Deal altering the face of constitutional 
71. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1985). 
72. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 59, at 85. 
73. Legal realism proved useful here; it offered a scathing criticism of values-based Lochner Court 
decisionmaking thereby putting into focus what had come before-that politics and ideology figure 
prominently in constitutional decisionmaking. As such, classical legal thought could not be reconciled 
with the New Deal revolution. 
74. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 
395, 454 ( 1995) (noting that during this period "the total value of manufactured products increased 
nearly twenty times; railroad track mileage went from under 40,000 miles nationwide to over 260,000; 
[and] the urban population increased from 16.1 percent to 49.1 percent"). 
75. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 175 (1941). See generally 
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 (1963); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421 ( 1987). 
76. See generally LEUCHTENBURG,' supra note 13. Unlike legal realist claims, however, this realpoli-
tik approach to constitutional interpretation does not deny the possibility that there is a correct way to 
interpret the Constitution. Rather, by emphasizing the ways in which the elected branches of govern-
ment shape constitutional doctrine, the possible correctness of an interpretation seems somewhat 
irrelevant. 
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interpretation. Nevertheless, by making no mention of constitutional controver-
sies that preceded the New Deal, their claims about legal realism's triumph and 
the ensuing decline of constitutional discourse seem overblown.77 Furthermore, 
by not considering the pivotal role that social and political forces play in 
constitutional discourse-thereby making judges and legal academics the exclu-
sive focus of their analysis-Seidman and Tushnet's reform proposals are too 
narrowly focused. With that said, their presentation fits their recommendations: 
by targeting legal elites and treating legal realism's triumph as a fait accompli, 
Seidman and Tushnet quite rightly advocate that judicial opinions and legal 
scholarship be more open about underlying values and more far-ranging in 
assessing competing policy considerations. 
As it turns out, this style of decisionmaking replicates the type of cost-benefit 
analysis associated with public policy analysis. For Seidman and Tushnet, of 
course, the inevitable politicization of constitutional discourse explains why 
constitutional interpretation should replicate public policy analysis. This asser-
tion, however, begs a fundamental question: Why have constitutional analysis at 
all? Remnants is silent on this question. Although imploring constitutionalists to 
act as if "[constitutional] arguments were not empty ... all the while knowing 
on a different level of consciousness that [they] ... most assuredly [are]," 78 
Seidman and Tushnet never ~xplain why we should engage in this charade. 
Why not simply say that everything is political and the Constitution-or, at 
least, constitutional interpretation-is a nullity? Much in Remnants supports 
this conclusion. In particular, the kind of dual consciousness that Seidman and 
Tushnet propose is almost certainly unworkable; once you commit to constitu-
tional argumentation to achieve your political preferences, you are going to 
forget to give an appreciative hearing to the other side. Seidman and Tushnet 
recognize this, lamenting "that no society in history" has been able to engage in 
the type of "skeptical commitment" that they embrace.79 Nevertheless, after 
"argu[ing] that constitutional argument in the modem context divides rather 
than unites," 80 and that this pattern is likely to persist,81 Seidman and Tushnet 
proclaim that "[for] all its deficiencies, constitutional argument would not have 
played such a prominent role in American public debate for so many years if it 
were not serving important purposes." 82 Moreover, they assert that "a world 
77. This is not to say that legal realist scholarship did not affect academic discourse. It did. Rather 
than focus on the categorization of legal doctrine through treatises, post-New Deal academic discourse 
critically evaluated the normative presumptions underlying such doctrine. See HOROWITZ, supra note 
13, at 247-68 (discussing post-World War II legal thought). 
78. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 200. 
79. !d. at 201. In calling for "skeptical commitment," Seidman and Tushnet hope that constitutional-
ists will link "an ironic self-awareness of the contingency of one's own beliefs" with a recognition that 
"constitutional rhetoric provides the only vocabulary we have for reaching beyond ourselves." /d. at 
200, 201. 
80. /d. at 194. 
81. Id. at 201. 
82. /d. at 193. 
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without constitutional rhetoric" would be dominated by "narrow interest groups" 
that care more about "raw power" than "the public good." 83 
Seidman and Tushnet never defend these sweeping claims. Instead, they take 
for granted that "raw power" matters more to the popularly-elected leviathan 
than it does to values-driven legal elites.84 Accordingly, Seidman and Tushnet 
do not blink when they suggest that thorough cost-benefit analysis is best 
accomplished by elites with life tenure-judges and academics-rather than by 
politicians beholden to "narrow interest groups." Under this approach, more-
over, there is no need to consider claims that courts should not make social 
policy because the adjudicative process is ill-adapted to ascertain social facts or 
because adjudication makes no provision for policy review.85 
Remnants's condemnation of interest group politics and political argument 
explains Seidman and Tushnet's belief that legal elites should matter and that 
constitutional interpretation legitimates their participation in shaping public 
policy. It also explains the book's nearly exclusive focus on Supreme Court 
decisions and legal academic analysis. When Seidman and Tushnet talk about 
the general culture, their real concern seems- to be that comer of the world 
dominated by judges and legal academics. In this way, Remnants is as values-
based and incomplete as the process-based theories it criticizes. Seidman and 
Tushnet fence out political discourse, including nonjudicial constitutional inter-
pretation, because they believe that leg.al elites are more capable of considering 
both sides of an issue than politicians or other governmental actors. 
Seidman and Tushnet's distaste for political decisionmaking begs the ques-
tion as to what types of policy decisions would be made by legal elites who 
wistfully pursue the superhuman task of skeptical commitment. Aside from 
suggesting that legal elites are shielded from the interest group pressures that 
doom politicians, Seidman and Tushnet make no attempt to assess the policy 
ramifications of their call for dual consciousness. Their explanation for this is 
that their sole concern relates to improving the quality of constitutional dis-
course, not to advancing a particular political agenda. Along these lines, and to 
Seidman and Tushnet's credit, Remnants goes to great lengths to suggest that 
progressives and conservatives are equally guilty of making simplistic, mislead-
ing, and unpersuasive constitutional arguments. They pair conservative judges 
and scholars with liberal judges and scholars. They demonstrate the difficulties 
associated with constitutional interpretation by highlighting weaknesses in both 
83. /d. at 193-94. 
84. There is something very strange about this argument. After relentlessly trashing judges and legal 
academics for engaging in biased and incomplete analysis, Seidman and Tushnet hail legal elites as the 
best available bulwark for liberty and deliberative process. 
85. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); R. SHEP MELNICK, 
REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL 
COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PuBLIC POLICY (1989). Seidman and Tushnet's condemna-
tion of interest-group politics, however, does not extend to claims that courts are as susceptible as 
elected officials to interest group capture. See, e.g., RABKIN, supra, at 147-81 (revealing capture of 
district and appeals courts in the District of Columbia by civil rights interests). 
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liberal and conservative arguments. They explain that, because their book is 
about the style of constitutional argument, "[they] will spare the reader [their] 
own efforts to manipulate constitutional argument." 86 These herculean efforts, it 
would seem, are intended to convince the reader that Remnants, in fact, is about 
improving constitutional interpretation by underscoring a shared failing of all 
constitutional advocates. 
Theoretically, at least, Remnants's process-oriented approach is neither lib-
eral nor conservative. For example, although Seidman and Tushnet are left-
leaning, their call for dual consciousness could produce conservative results. 87 
Consider the potential for narrative-based jurisprudence: Environmentalists will 
put themselves in the position of hardy rural property owners; feminists will 
imagine the (short) life of a fetus; and card-carrying members of the American 
Civil Liberties Union will think about the victim before they suggest that the 
criminal must go free because the constable has blundered.88 
What is theoretically possible and what is likely to occur, however, are two 
quite different things. When Seidman and Tushnet finished working on Rem-
nants in May 1995,89 the Republican takeover of Congress was in full swing. 
Moreover, with two Supreme Court appointments under his belt, President Bill 
Clinton demonstrated that he "was unwilling to undertake even moderate risk" 
to select a nominee willing "to depart from conventional wisdom. " 90 As such, 
the political process offered little hope of "radical[izing]" a Supreme Court 
dominated by moderate and conservative Republican appointees.91 In contrast 
to the Republican Congress, legal elites, especially the legal academics who are 
Remnants's principal audience, are politically left of center.92 Not surprisingly, 
legal elite-dominated policy analysis will almost certainly be to the left of 
elected government preferences.93 For example, it is hard to imagine legal elite 
86. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note 1, at 25. 
87. For this very reason, Suzanna Sherry criticized Mark Tushnet's "unremitting attack on judicial 
review" in Red, White, and Blue, supra note 49. Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1418, 
1437 (1989). For Sherry, "[l]t is dangerously utopian to assume that if one destroys the status quo it 
will be replaced by the political agenda of the left rather than of the right." /d. 
88. Thanks to Alan Meese for these examples. 
89. SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 1, at viii . 
90. /d. at 192. 
91. /d. 
92. The representation of demographic groups at the top 100 law schools reveals that law professors 
are far more liberal than the general population. For example, although 46.2% of the full-time working 
population are Democrats, 80.4% of law faculty are Democrats. James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity, 
Speech to the National Association of Scholars (Jan. 5, 1997) (transcript on file with The Georgetown 
Law Journal). More striking, although 14.9% of full-time working women are Republicans, 0.5% of 
women law faculty are Republicans. /d.; see also Earl M. Maltz, The Coun, the Academy, and the 
Constitution: A Comment on Bowers v. Hardwick and Its Critics, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 59 (reviewing 
academic writings on privacy questions and concluding that academic commentary on constitutional 
law reveals a "general commitment to left-center political values"). 
93. At other times, however, political discourse may yield more progressive outcomes than Court-
dominated discourse. See infra note 110. Nonetheless, legal academic discourse almost always yields 
left-center outcomes. See Maltz, supra note 92, at 92. Furthermore, during the heyday of the Warren 
Court, when Seidman and Tushnet came of age, legal elite discourse was more "radical" than political 
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discourse resulting in a massive overhaul of welfare, the repudiation of same 
sex marriage, the denial of antidiscrimination protections to gays and lesbians, 
the reenactment of abortion funding restrictions, or the elimination of certain 
affirmative action programs.94 
Along these lines, a skeptical reading of Remnants suggests that Seidman and 
Tushnet's personal commitment to compassionate, progressive, activist jurispru-
dence influences both their explication of why constitutional questions are hard 
and their analysis of Supreme Court decisionmaking.95 Most striking, in demon-
strating the complexity of constitutional issues, Remnants implicitly calls into 
question the correctness of decisions almost certainly at odds with Seidman and 
Tushnet's personal preferences. No progressive Warren Court decision is put 
under its microscope. The focal point, instead, is the conservative decisionmak-
ing of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. In addition to DeShaney, Remnants 
examines the Court's approval of the death penalty,96 its rejection of impact-based 
proofs of discrimination,97 and its resurrection of federalism-based limits on congres-
sional authority.98 While these analyses highlight both the strengths and weaknesses 
of conservative and progressive positions, Seidman and Tushnet invest substantially 
more effort in proving that conservative arguments do not take into account progres-
discourse. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 192. For this reason, Seidman and Tushnet's embrace 
of legal elite discourse may reflect a "liberal nostalgia for the[ir]lost youth." /d. at 191. See infra note 
II 0 and accompanying text. 
94. A recent Association of American Law Schools (AALS) newsletter is emblematic of legal 
educators' left-leaning tendencies. Spread out over 16 pages of the March 1996 AALS newsletter were 
two articles concerning minority hiring and retention at law schools; an article on the experiences of 
women in legal education; an announcement of an AALS workshop on gay and lesbian legal issues; an 
essay by AALS President Wallace Loh calling for a "commitment to broadening the boundaries of 
inclusiveness of our profession, especially at a time when that commitment is under assault nation-
wide"; and, most significant, an AALS Executive Committee statement embracing race- and gender-
based affirmative action. See THE NEWSLETTER (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1996, at I, 
5, 6, 7, 9, 16. 
95. Seidman and Tushnet's approval of progressive, activist decisionmaking is clear. They applaud 
the Warren Court for its "idealism and moral drama," SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 190, attack 
President Clinton for not "desir[ing] a return to Warren Coun activism," id. at 190, and condemn New 
Deal judges for failing to "chang[ e) the distribution of social and economic power." /d. at 135. 
Correspondingly, they lament the fact that New Dealers "(i]ronically ... put in place a conservative 
judicial ideology because at the time it seemed the best way to open up the space for promising 
possibilities of liberal legislative action." /d. at 138. The New Deal Supreme Court, for example, was 
far less"likely to strike down state and federal laws than the Lochner Court before it or the Warren Court 
after it . See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 125, 
167 n.l31 (charting patterns in Supreme Court's invalidation of state and federal law). 
96. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 140-65. 
97./d.at99-116. 
98. /d. at 182-89. This inventory is representative but incomplete. Seidman and Tushnet make brief 
mention of several other Supreme Court decisions. They also consider, in greater detail, the Supreme 
Court's conditional offer doctrine as well as its resistance to government efforts to regulate pornography 
and to set limits on the financing of political campaigns./d. at 72-90, 117-39. These analyses, however, 
confirm Seidman and Tushnet's penchant for dissecting that with which they disagree. For example, 
their chapter on pornography and the financing of political campaigns emphasizes the sensibility of 
government regulation to protect women and candidates who do not appeal to the political mainstream. 
/d. atll7-39. 
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sive counterarguments than in revealing similar limits of progressive argu-
ments.99 Furthermore, they speak approvingly of progressives committed to 
"social justice" 100 and critically of "polemical," 101 "right wing scholars." 102 
Seidman and Tushnet err in their choice of targets. By focusing their analysis 
on that with which they disagree and by lauding their friends while mocking 
their enemies, Seidman and Tushnet make it too easy for conservatives to 
dismiss their work as yet another leftist attack on the Rehnquist Court. 103 
Without question, a cynic can easily conclude that Seidman and Tushnet's real 
interest is to encourage a return to the Warren-era judicial activism they 
applaud. This is unfortunate, for Remnants is an important b~ok. It highlights 
the complexity of social policy issues that animate constitutional interpretation. 
It offers lucid and often devastating criticism of Court doctrine and academic 
writings. In so doing, it convincingly argues that constitutional interpretation is 
often incomplete, if not a smoke screen for some political agenda. Furthermore, 
its recommendation that advocates open themselves up to competing positions 
seems heartfelt and desirable. For these reasons, it is important to consider 
Remnants's central claim that the politicization of constitutional advocacy has 
made the Constitution irrelevant. The remainder of this review considers and 
ultimately rejects this claim, arguing instead that there is something healthy as 
well as inevitable about the current state of affairs. 
III. Two CHEERS FOR THE STATUS Quo 
Ten years ago, then United States Attorney General Edwin Meese sparked 
controversy by arguing that the executive and legislative branches have a duty 
99. For example, weaknesses in the policy arguments advanced by death penalty proponents receive 
at least twice as much attention as Seidman and Tushnet's dissection of abolitionist policy arguments. 
!d. at 147-52. Even more revealing, Seidman and Tushnet lambast the Court's rejection of disparate 
impact proofs in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), condemning the decision as "fundamen-
tally incompatible" with "one of the most famous and celebrated decisions in constitutional law-
Brown v. Board of Education," 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown/). SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 
104-05. Contrary to this characterization, I have argued elsewhere that Brown and Davis are compat-
ible. See Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44 VAND. L. REv. 15 (1991). Nevertheless, despite 
their unbalanced treatment of conservative and progressive positions, I found much of Seidman and 
Tushnet's critique persuasive. 
100. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note 1, at 12. 
101. /d. 
102. /d. at 18. In particular, Laurence Tribe is celebrated for devoting his "not inconsiderable energy 
and ingenuity to ... further the cause of social justice," while Robert Bork is dissed for "producing 
polemical writings seemingly designed to curry favor with his conservative patrons." !d. at 12. 
Moreover, Remnants pays far more attention to progressive scholarship than it does to conservative 
scholarship. Sources cited in the book's bibliographic essay tend to advance progressive values. For 
example, with only one or two exceptions, sources cited in the chapter on race-"limited to a few of 
the most influential works" -embrace progressive values./d. at 210. 
103. Seidman and Tushnet are their own worst enemies. After telling us that most constitutional 
interpreters, including themselves, shield their policy preferences behind ostensibly neutral constitu-
tional analysis, they invite a skeptical reading of their book. To establish credibility, Seidman and 
Tushnet should bend over backwards to call attention to the failings of leftist academics and judges, 
rather than highlight their admiration of their compatriots. 
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to interpret the Constitution and, consequently, Supreme Court decisions are not 
forever "binding on all ... parts of government." 104 Although castigated as a 
"jurisprudential stink bomb" by the New Republic's Michael Kinsley 105 and 
condemned for "invit[ing] anarchy" by the New York Times's Anthony Lewis, 106 
the Meese speech triggered renewed interest in the study of how courts and 
political actors communicate with each other. Over the past decade, political 
scientists and legal academics have written a spate of books and articles 
assessing the quality of constitutional interpretation by elected government and 
the consequences of interchanges with the judiciary. 107 Even Clinton Supreme 
Court appointee Ruth Bader Ginsburg has entered this fray, emphasizing the 
importance of three-branch constitutional dialogues and arguing that judges "do 
not alone shape legal doctrine." 108 
For Seidman and Tushnet, however, this topic holds little interest. Perceiving 
that the politicization of constitutional interpretation has been its downfall, they 
appear to have written off political actors altogether. 109 Although never commit-
ting to one view or another on the appropriate role of the political branches in 
constitutional dispute resolution, Remnants nowhere suggests that its lessons of 
openness and honesty are relevant to political actors. 110 Moreover, by assuming 
I 04. Edwin Meese Ill, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REv. 979, 986 ( 1987). 
105. Michael Kinsley, Meese 's Stink Bomb, WASH. PosT, Oct. 29, 1986, at Al9. 
106. Anthony Lewis, LAw of Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23. 
107. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PRo-
CESS (1988); JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Symposium, Elected Branch 
Influences in Constitutional Decisionmaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at I . 
108. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice , 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1198 (1992). 
109. For example, although recognizing that "[c]onstitutional rhetoric is the language of American 
politics," SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 3, and that "we are stuck with a system in which 
constitutional argument will continue to play a central role in political debate," id. at 4, they never 
consider what politicians have done or should do. Their effort "to focus on the quality of [constitu-
tional] argument," id., examines only the opinions of judges and the writings of legal academics. Along 
these lines, they are disappointed that legal academics, like politicians, make partisan, closed-minded 
arguments in their academic writings and elsewhere. /d. at 9, 15. Yet, by focusing on the work of 
academics with close ties to the world of politics, Seidman and Tushnet make politicized academic 
writings seem more prevalent than they in fact are. For example, all five legal academics highlighted in 
their introductory chapter-Robert Bork, Michael McConnell, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, and 
Laurence Tribe-have close ties to political interests. Bork served as, among other things, Solicitor 
General and Acting Attorney General for Presidents Nixon and Ford. McConnell, a Reagan administra-
tion political appointee, represents religious conservatives both in court and before Congress. Strauss 
ran much of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Supreme Court confirmation hearing for David Souter 
and helped draft the President's Supreme Court brief in the Paula Jones lawsuit. Sunstein worked with 
the Clinton transition team in 1992 and has testified before Congress on several occasions. And Tribe 
represents progressive interests in court and before Congress. 
110. In fact, Seidman and Tushnet's decision to make legal academic discourse the focus of their 
analysis and recommendations suggests just the opposite. Interestingly, Seidman and Tushnet do not 
consider the possibility, advanced by many left-leaning academics, that the progressive agenda is best 
served through political actors, not courts. See, e.g., RoSENBERG, supra note 108, at 342-43; ROBIN 
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 290-318 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil 
Rights and Civil Libenies Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. I, 7-18 (1996). This choice of emphasis may 
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the worst about the sound bite adversarial quality of politics, Seidman and 
Tushnet never examine the possible virtues of the politicization of constitutional 
discourse, which is certainly more relevant and may be more enduring than 
legal elite constitutional discourse. 
Without question, constitutional interpretation by the elected branches makes 
constitutional discourse more relevant. Through television, newspapers, and 
other media outlets, the public is made aware of constitutional controversies 
through elected government action, including the efforts of interest groups to 
pressure political actors. In fact, Americans are far more aware of elected 
government action that has constitutional ramifications than they are of Su-
preme Court decisionmaking. Media coverage plays a large role here; because 
Court decisions are episodic, media attention to Court action pales in compari-
son to the coverage given to the ongoing political and cultural battles over 
abortion, affirmative action, school prayer, and other divisive issues. 111 
Seidman and Tushnet do not deny that the constitutionalization of American 
politics profoundly affects public awareness of, and interest in, constitutional 
interpretation. 112 In many respects, this is their principal complaint about 
contemporary constitutional discourse-that it is rhetorically divisive, inconsis-
tent, and closed-minded, precisely because it is too much like politics. 113 At the 
same time, their model of activist, compassionate judicial review will only 
exacerbate the politicization of constitutional discourse. Politicians seeking 
reelection are drawn to those constitutional issues that affect the lives of their 
well be generational. Seidman and Tushnet are part of a "generation of commentators [who were] born 
late enough to ... build upon the New Deal's egalitarianism." Martin Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The 
Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION 
THAT WASN'T 218, 237 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). More precisely, they came of age "at the very time 
the New Deal's welfarism had faltered in the legislative and executive arenas" while, thanks to the 
Warren Court, "it had moved forward persistently in the judicial arena." /d. at 220. As a result, 
Seidman and Tushnet simultaneously embrace the New Deal's commitment to social justice and 
disavow its repudiation of activist judicial review. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 135. For 
identical reasons, as Martin Shapiro aptly observes, Seidman and Tushnet are part of a generation that 
"can love the Warren Court ... [but] cannot love the Burger Court ... because the Burger Court is 
responsive to, and a victim of, the breakdown of the New Deal consensus." Shapiro, supra, at 237 
(emphasis omitted). Accordingly, Seidman and Tushnet's Court-centered approach may well be rooted 
in their need "to satisfy liberal nostalgia" for times gone but not forgotten. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra 
note I , at 191. 
Ill. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the 
Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 356-57, 370 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995). 
112. Remnants, moreover, does not dispute that political action influences constitutional decisionmak-
ing. In fact, Tushnet has suggested that a nexus may well exist between the 1994 Republican takeover 
of Congress and the Supreme Court's increasing recognition of federalism-based limits on congres-
sional action. See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional 
Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 846 ( 1996). 
113. Seidman and Tushnet have reason to see the language of politics as directly contradictory to 
their proposal for honest, broadly focused constitutional analysis. Politicians are partisan. Their public 
pronouncements are one-sided, not soul-searching. They manipulate doctrine, theory, and facts to 
support their positions. Their fact-finding hearings are filled with witnesses who will say what the 
politicians want to hear. Indeed, they will only invoke the Constitution when it suits their purposes, 
typically to bring down proposals they dislike. 
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constituents. 114 Activist judicial review undoubtedly will increase the impact of 
constitutional interpretation and, with it, political interest in constitutional 
decisionmaking. Witness, for example, FDR's political campaign against the wch-
ner Court, Richard Nixon's attack against progressive Warren Court decisions, and 
Ronald Reagan's pledge to appoint judges "who share our commitment to 
judicial restraint." 115 
Politics, however, is not simply the price paid for activist judicial review. 
Politics also informs legal elites about what matters to the American public. For 
committed legal realists like Seidman and Tushnet, an understanding of what 
animates social and political forces should be critical. For this reason, legal 
elites should not be shielded from the hurly-burly of politics. Instead, to ensure 
"that Jaw serves the community's purposes, and that these purposes are the 
prerogative of common citizenship and not the preserve of academic exper-
tise," 116 the words and deeds of legal elites are proper) y subject to the tugs and 
pulls of politics. 
Take the case of Lani Guinier, whose nomination to head the Justice Depart-
ment's Civil Rights Division was pulled in the midst of a political firestorrn 
about her academic writings. Seidman and Tushnet, who admire Guinier's 
"fairminded and qualified" arguments, lament her rough treatment in "the 
world of sound bites and op-ed articles." 117 No doubt, Guinier was shabbily 
treated, especially by her Democratic sponsors. But, in important respects, 
Guinier's rough treatment was salutary. It informed legal academics, interest 
groups, and others about the political saliency of Guinier's writings (or, at least, 
the saliency of the ideas attributed to Guinier). In effect, social and political 
forces have made Guinier's writings more textured and more revealing. 118 
The politicization of constitutional discourse informs constitutional interpreta-
tion in other important ways. Hydraulic pressures within the political system 
may well make the Constitution more enduring as well as more relevant. In 
particular, constitutional dialogues between the courts and elected government 
often result in more vibrant and durable constitutional interpretation. Abortion 
and school desegregation are two prime examples of this phenomenon. In both 
instances, courts and elected officials influenced each other, resulting in a constitu-
tional standard that successfully (if not perfectly) balances competing interests. 
114. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECfORAL CONNECfiON (1974) (arguing that 
re-election is principal motivation driving behavior of members of Congress). 
115. Text of 1984 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, vol. XL, 41-8, 
55-B (1984). 
116. Robert Post, Lani Guinier; Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal Scholarship, 11 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 185, 193 (1994). 
117. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 15. 
118. In the case of Guinier, this is particularly important. Her controversial writings were about 
ways to enhance the political power of the minority community. As a result, political reaction to her 
writings is instructive in evaluating her claims about political power. Another example of political 
discourse improving the thinking of legal elites is the conflagration over Robert Bork's Supreme Court 
nomination. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER: CENSORING OURSELVES 
IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 27-43 (1994 ). 
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The saga of abortion rights underscores the interactive nature of constitu-
tional decisionmaking. Roe v. Wade 119 served as a critical trigger to the judicial 
recognition of abortion rights, overcoming politically potent pro-life interests 
that have always stood in the way of populist abortion reform. 120 Roe also 
prompted the elected branches of government into action. From 1973 to 1989, 
306 abortion-restricting measures were passed by forty-eight states. 121 In 1992, 
after decades of elected government resistance as well as the appointment of 
new Supreme Court Justices, the Court responded to these pressures and 
returned much of the decisionmaking power relating to this divisive issue back 
to the states. Repudiating Roe's stringent trimester test in favor of a more 
deferential "undue burden" standard, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 122 while 
reaffirming "the central holding of Roe," signalled the Court's increased willing-
ness to uphold state regulation of abortion. 123 
Casey, however, did not trigger an antiabortion revolution. According to Alan 
Guttmacher Institute studies, "antiabortion legislators [have] heeded [Casey] 
... and curtailed their attempts to make abortion illegal." 124 In 1994, for 
example, no legislation was introduced to outlaw abortion. Furthermore, in the 
two years following Casey, one-third of abortion-related legislative initiatives would 
have guaranteed the right to abortion. Finally, of the handful of abortion-
restricting regulations adopted since Casey, all involve restrictions approved by 
the Court-waiting periods, informed consent, and parental notification. 
Casey appears to have stabilized, if not resolved, the abortion dispute. While 
the Supreme Court eviscerated Roe's trimester standard, the post-Casey calm 
reveals that Roe shaped elected government attitudes. Contrary to the pre-Roe 
period, during which forty-six states either prohibited or severely limited abor-
tion access, 125 abortion rights are now a secure feature of our con-stitutional 
landscape. 
Without question, to a pro-choice advocate, Casey's balance sells out impor-
tant interests of women, and, to a pro-lifer, it permits moral outrages to 
continue. But there is no realistic alternative to Casey's balancing act. The 
political upheaval that followed Roe reveals the unworkability of a strident 
pro-choice jurisprudence. But a jurisprudence allowing the prohibition of abor-
119. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
120. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 359, 374 {1993) (explaining that when Roe was 
decided pro-choice activists had abandoned efforts to seek legislative repeal of criminal abortion 
statutes). For a competing, but in my opinion incorrect, perspective, see Ginsburg, supra note 109, at 
1208 (suggesting that early 1970s legislative reform efforts had set the stage for more far-reaching 
legislative reforms). 
121. See Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, 20 Pusuus 27, 43 (1990). 
122. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
123. /d. at 878 (plurality opinion). 
124. STATE REPROD. HEALTH MONITOR (Alan Guttmacher lnst., New York, N.Y.), May 1994, at ii. 
125. There is good reason to think that politically potent pro-life interests, at least at the time of Roe, 
would have successfully blocked the efforts of pro-choice advocates to repeal or modify abortion 
restrictions in state legislatures. See Neal Devins, The CountenTUljoritarian Paradox, 93 MICH. L. REv. 
1433, 1445-48 (1995). 
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tions is equally unworkable. In the years before Roe, when nontherapeutic 
abortions were prohibited in nearly every state, abortions were almost as 
common as they are today. 126 Ultimately, abortion is too divisive for either 
pro-choice or pro-life absolutism to rule the day. Absent the constitutional 
dialogue that followed Roe, however, the politically unworkable trimester stan-
dard would have remained in place. 
Supreme Court efforts to end racial segregation in education likewise exem-
plify the reaches and limits of the judiciary's ability to transform society. On the 
one hand, Brown v. Board of Education 127 proved critical to the eradication of 
dual school systems in southern states. In particular, Brown can be linked to a 
series of 1960s legislative and regulatory initiatives. 128 The 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, for example, authorized Justice Department participation in school desegre-
gation litigation and demanded that federal grant recipients, such as school 
systems, operate in a nondiscriminatory manner. 129 
On the other hand, beginning with Brown, the Supreme Court allowed its 
perception of elected government preferences to shape its decisionmaking in 
this area. In an effort to temper southern hostility to its decision, the Court did 
not issue a remedy in the first Brown decision. One year later, while declaring 
that desegregation must proceed with "all deliberate speed," 130 the Court 
recognized that "varied local school problems" were best solved by "[s]chool 
authorities" and that delays associated with "problems related to administra-
tion" were to be expected. 131 By taking into account potential resistance to its 
decision, the Court in Brown engaged in the type of interest-balancing that has 
set political parameters on judicial intervention in equal educational opportunity. 
Noting that "some achievable remedial effectiveness may be sacrificed because of 
other social interests" and that "a limited remedy" may be chosen "when a more 
effective one is too costly to other interests," 132 the Court recognized that the rights of 
victims of discrimination must be balanced against a broad spectrum of competing 
policy concerns. Specifically, aside from victims' rights, the Court in Brown valued 
local control of public school systems and judicial restraint. 133 
126. See RosENBERG, supra note I 08, at 178-80. For critiques of this claim, see Peter H. Schuck, 
Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763, 1777-80 (1993) (suggesting that 
abortion rates could have declined if Roe had been decided the other way); Neal Devins, Judicial 
Matters, SO CAL. L. REv. 1027, 1057-58 (1992) (arguing that Roe prompted the opening of abortion 
clinics throughout the country, making abortion safer and more readily available). 
1276. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown l). 
128. See Devins, supra note 126, at 1039-46. 
129. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). For further discussion of the role that elected government played in 
advancing the Brown mandate, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 59, at 242-56. 
130. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). 
131. /d.at299-300. 
132. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 599 (1983). 
133. For this reason, I disagree with Seidman and Tushnet's conclusion that "Brown implies that the 
government has an affirmative obligation to take whatever measures are required to end the subjugation 
of African-Americans as a group." SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 107. 
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Social and political forces, especially federal government efforts to enforce 
Brown during the 1960s, also figured prominently in the Supreme Court's 
approval of mandatory busing remedies in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education. 134 Swann, however, went well beyond elected government 
preferences. During the Nixon and Reagan administrations, the Court and the 
elected branches of government fought a pitched battle over busing, a battle that 
has now abated. In 1991 and again in 1992, the Supreme Court, as it did with 
abortion, recognized greater state and local control over public schools 135 and 
limited a controversial hard-line position rather than disavowing it. Thus, an 
equilibrium of sorts has been achieved. Specifically, by empowering district 
court judges to take local circumstances into account in deciding whether a 
school system has satisfied its desegregation obligations, 136 the Rehnquist Court 
has emphasized concerns for local control and judicial restraint at the expense 
of victims' rights. At the same time, these rulings neither require nor encourage 
district court judges to terminate school desegregation injunctions. Conse-
quently, although rejecting district court efforts to include suburban school 
systems in a Kansas City, Missouri desegregation order, 137 the Court did not 
interfere with intrusive district court orders requiring state-subsidized housing 
construction in Yonkers, New York138 and imposing a statewide tax levy to 
support desegregation in Kansas City. 139 
Attaining an equilibrium with regard to school desegregation and abortion 
required all branches and all levels of government to do battle with one another. 
This dynamic process yielded a very nuanced, very delicate (if not very 
deliberate) compromise. That this interactive process may too closely resemble 
the making of sausage helps to explain Barbara Craig and David O'Brien's 
characterization of the abortion dispute as an "illustrative ... [and] disappoint-
ing reflection" of the American system. 140 Nevertheless, as Justice Ginsburg 
rightly observed at her confirmation hearing, our system is one in which courts 
"do not guard constitutional rights alone. Courts share that profound responsibil-
ity with Congress, the [P]resident, the states, and the people." 141 
That courts sometimes initiate these constitutional dialogues is indisputable. 
For that reason, although judicially created "rights talk" sometimes stands as a 
134. 402 U.S. I (1970). 
135. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485-92 (1992) (identifying several factors that supervising 
district courts should consider when relinquishing control over implementation of desegregation plan to 
school districts); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (recognizing that once school 
district complies with desegregation decree, federal courts no longer retain regulatory control over 
school policies and rules). 
136. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248-49. 
137. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). 
138. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 
1055 (1988). 
139. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
140. BARBARA H. CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLffiCS 15 (1993). 
141. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg Stresses Value of Incremental Change, WASH. PosT, July 21, 1993, 
atA6. 
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roadblock to innovative public policy, 142 courts often play an indispensable role 
in prompting elected government action. For example, without Brown or Roe, 
equal educational opportunity and abortion rights might well have meant very 
different things today. But, it is equally indisputable that workable approaches to 
school desegregation and abortion rights required elected government participa-
tion, sometimes supporting and at other times opposing Court action. 143 Thus, 
although there may be "a magnetic attraction to the notion of an ultimate 
constitutional interpreter," 144 complex social policy issues are better resolved 
through "the sweaty intimacy of creatures locked in combat." 145 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional decisionmaking is. a never-ending process involving all branches 
and all levels of government. Remnants, by not considering how nonjudicial 
actors participate in shaping constitutional values, implicitly embraces a faulty 
vision of constitutional decisionmaking. As a result, the book's supposedly 
neutral process-based reform proposals appear grounded in a normative vision 
of judicial supremacy. 146 Making matters worse, Seidman and Tushnet's proof 
of the ways that political preferences drive constitutional interpretation begs the 
question of why courts should shape public policy through values-based consti-
tutional interpretation. 
Ironically, had Seidman and Tushnet considered nonjudicial influences, they 
would have had a much easier time defending activist judicial review. Let me 
explain. Courts, as school desegregation and abortion make clear, sometimes 
trigger a national dialogue about both the power of government and the rights of 
individuals. Moreover, as underscored by the Supreme Court's willingness to 
disrupt prevailing elected government norms in Brown and Roe, judges and 
142. Bob Nagel, for example, contends that "[t]he judiciary's frequent intervention in ordinary 
political affairs works against both the preservation and healthy growth of our constitutional traditions." 
ROBERT f. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 3 (1989); see also Jeremy Rabkin, Racial Progress and Constitutional Roadblocks, 34 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 75 (1992). 
143. The evolution of school desegregation and abortion decisionmaking is a testament to the 
profound role political actors play in shaping constitutional doctrine. Accordingly, the distinction 
between theory and practice or implementation does not explain Seidman and Tushnet's failure to 
consider political influences. 
144. Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret: The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 
48 REV. POL. 401,417 (1981). 
145. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 261 (2d ed. 1986); see also JOHN 
AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 167 (1984) ("The genius of the 
system lies in the very tension itself, and in our ability to combine an active democracy, constitutional 
principles, and judicial judgment."). Whether or not "the day-to-day job of upholding the Constitution 
. .. rests ... on the shoulders of every citizen," Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 202 (1962), "[w]e reject Supremacy in all three branches because of the value 
placed upon freedom, discourse, democracy, and limited government." FISHER, supra note 108, at 279. 
146. This assertion is also supported by Seidman and Tushnet's embrace of activist judicial review 
as well as their sympathetic portrayal of the pre-New Deal period as an era when "genteel discussion 
within an elite" was possible. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note 1, at 165. 
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politicians sometimes react differently to social and political forces. Accord-
ingly, because special interest group pressures affect courts and elected officials 
in different ways, a full-ranging consideration of the costs and benefits of 
different policy outcomes is best accomplished by a government-wide decision-
making process. For this reason, courts and elected officials should both be 
activist in shaping government policy. 
Seidman and Tushnet's disdain for the language of politics, however, makes 
it impossible for them to see the virtues of the current system. As a result, 
although their complaints about the politicization of constitutional discourse are 
well-founded, contemporary constitutional discourse may not be the horror 
show they describe. Seidman and Tushnet thus go too far in condemning "the 
New Deal revolution" for destroying "the possibility of genteel discussion 
within an elite." 147 True, at the tum of the century, constitutional debate was 
less fierce, less partisan, and more or less in the control of legal elites. 
Constitutional interpretation, however, also affected fewer lives. In other words, 
by embracing politically charged, activist, progressive judicial review, Seidman 
and Tushnet should be more accepting of the possibility that joint political and 
legal dialogue sometimes produces good results. Put another way: Seidman and 
Tushnet should follow their own advice and explicitly take into account the 
perspectives and counterarguments of individuals, such as myself, who see 
virtues in the current system. 
147. /d. 
